Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) offers a pragmatic justification for belief in God, positing that even if God’s existence is improbable, the potential benefits of belief are so substantial that wagering on theism is rational. Pascal’s argument unfolds in three forms: the super-dominance argument, the expectations argument, and the dominating expectations argument, each adding a layer of sophistication to his core idea.
However, critics have posed several classic challenges.
- (i) Intellectualism contends that deliberately choosing beliefs is practically impossible, though this critique is often deemed both questionable and irrelevant.
- (ii) The many-gods objection argues that Pascal’s wager is irrational for assuming a specific form of God, which open-minded agnostics might not accept. Pascalians counter this with concepts of genuine options, run-off decision theory, and generic theism, though these defenses have their vulnerabilities.
- (iii) Evidentialism claims that Pascalian reasoning is epistemically irresponsible and thus immoral, suggesting that either God is an evidentialist or we should be.
- (iv) Various paradoxes emphasize the problematic use of infinite values in decision-theoretic reasoning.
Reason for Believing in God
Arguments for theism generally fall into two categories. Traditional, epistemic arguments assert that God exists, examples being cosmological, design, ontological, and experiential arguments. Modern, pragmatic arguments propose that belief in God is beneficial or morally right, regardless of God’s existence. These include William James’s “will to believe” and Pascal’s wager.
Pascal, a French philosopher, scientist, mathematician, and probability theorist, contends that in the absence of certainty about God’s existence, believing in God is safer than risking the consequences of disbelief. His argument uses decision theory and can be illustrated through a lottery analogy, where the rational choice is guided by calculating expected utilities.
The Super-Dominance Argument
Pascal begins with a simple matrix:
| God exists | God does not exist | |
|---|---|---|
| You believe in God | Infinite reward | Finite reward |
| You don’t believe | Infinite punishment | Finite punishment |
If God exists, believers enjoy eternal bliss (infinite reward) while non-believers face eternal damnation (infinite punishment). If God does not exist, believers still gain some finite happiness, and non-believers might experience less happiness due to the lack of religious comfort. Thus, believing in God is rational.
The Expectations Argument
Considering a more nuanced scenario where an atheist might be happier than a theist in this life, with a 50-50 chance of God’s existence, we calculate expectations:
| God exists | God does not exist | |
|---|---|---|
| You believe in God | +infinity | Finite value |
| You don’t believe | -infinity | Finite value |
Believing in God yields an expectation of positive infinity, while not believing results in negative infinity. Hence, it remains rational to believe in God.
The Dominating Expectations Argument
Even if the probability of God’s existence is not exactly 50-50, any finite probability still results in an infinite expectation for belief in God due to the infinite value associated with divine reward.
Is Belief a Matter of Choice?
According to doxastic voluntarism, beliefs can be chosen. Critics argue that beliefs cannot be adopted merely by decision, using examples like trying to believe the sky is green. However, while direct belief might be impossible, actions leading to belief, such as engaging with religious communities or practices, can be chosen. This indirect route shows that belief formation involves both volition and external contingencies.
Do Rival Religious Options Undermine Each Other?
Denis Diderot argued that Pascal’s wager could apply to various religions, not just Christianity, highlighting the need to consider multiple theological possibilities:
| Yahweh exists | Allah exists | |
|---|---|---|
| Worship Yahweh | Infinite reward | Infinite punishment |
| Worship Allah | Infinite punishment | Infinite reward |
Responses include the notion of genuine options, run-off decision theory, relativism, and generic theism. Each response faces its own challenges, particularly in justifying the exclusion of certain religious possibilities and addressing the many-gods objection.
Is Prudential Reasoning Ethical?
Two versions of this objection exist. One questions whether Pascalian reasoning is manipulative and whether God might disapprove of belief based on self-interest. The other, rooted in evidentialism, suggests that it is categorically wrong to base beliefs on prudential reasoning. This debate intersects with larger moral philosophical discussions.
Is Decision Theory Coherent?
The coherence of decision theory, especially when infinite values are involved, is debated. Critics argue that decision theory becomes nonsensical with infinite utilities, as illustrated by the St. Petersburg paradox. Responses to this problem include proposing finite yet arbitrarily high rewards, although this does not fully address the underlying issues.
The Takeaway
Pascal’s wager remains a compelling and controversial argument in the philosophy of religion. Its strength lies in its pragmatic approach, appealing to the rational self-interest of individuals weighing the potential infinite benefits of belief against the finite losses of disbelief. However, its limitations and criticisms, from the many-gods objection to the coherence of decision theory involving infinite values, highlight the complexity of applying pragmatic reasoning to matters of faith. Ultimately, Pascal’s wager serves as a thought-provoking entry point into broader discussions on belief, reason, and the human condition, encouraging continuous exploration and debate among philosophers, theologians, and laypeople alike.
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